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Abstract: In a successive Cournot oligopoly, we show the welfare effects of entry in 
the final goods market with no scale economies but with cost difference between the 
firms. If the input market is very concentrated, entry in the final goods market always 
increases welfare. If the input market is moderately concentrated, entry in the final 
goods market reduces welfare if the entrant is moderately cost inefficient than the 
incumbents. If the input market is highly competitive, entry in the final goods market 
reduces welfare if the entrant is very much cost inefficient than the incumbents. 
Hence, entry in the final goods market is more desirable under a concentrated input 
market. It follows from our analysis that entry increases the profits of the incumbent 
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The welfare effects of entry: the role of the input market 
 
1. Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to consider the welfare effects of entry in the final goods 
market when the input market is imperfectly competitive and the entrant in the final 
goods market is cost inefficient than the incumbents. In this respect, we show that 
input-market concentration may play an important role. 
  The welfare effects of entry in imperfectly competitive markets have received 
attention for a long time. There are two strands of this literature. One strand of 
literature shows that entry in an imperfectly competitive market may be welfare 
reducing in the presence of scale economies. The earlier works in this area implicitly 
assume that the input markets are perfectly competitive, and therefore, entry does not 
affect the marginal costs of the firms (Williamson, 1968, Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977, von 
Weizsäcker, 1980, Perry, 1984, Mankiw and Whinston, 1986, Suzumura and Kiyono, 
1987, Okuno-Fujiwara and Suzumura, 1993, Anderson et al., 1995 and Fudenberg 
and Tirole, 2000). Recent works look at the vertical structure
1 where the marginal 
costs of the firms are endogenously determined (Ghosh and Morita, 2007a and b and 
Mukherjee, 2008).
2 The second strand of the literature shows the welfare effects of 
                                                 
1 It is needless to say that vertical relationship between the firms is quite common in real world. For 
example, automobile manufacturers purchase steel, tire and many other parts produced by other firms. 
The markets for microprocessors, aircraft-engines, packaged products and energy or power generating 
sectors are also characterized by vertical relationships. Komiya (1975) pointed out the industries such 
as iron and steel, petroleum refining, petrochemicals, cement, paper and pulp, and sugar refining with 
the tendency to develop excessive competition. While the industries mentioned in Komiya (1975) are 
characterized by homogeneous products and oligopoly, they produce intermediate goods for the final 
goods producers. 
2 In a recent paper, Mukherjee and Mukherjee (2008) show the welfare effects of entry in the presence 
of technology licensing, which affects the marginal cost of the licensee.   2
entry in the absence of scale economies but under marginal cost asymmetries between 
the final goods producers. Klemperer (1988) shows that entry of a cost inefficient 
entrant may be welfare reducing.
3 Ghosh and Saha (2007) confirm this conclusion 
with free entry. However, so far, this strand of the literature has ignored the role of 
the input markets. Our paper fills this gap by considering entry in a successive 
Cournot oligopoly where the entrant is cost inefficient than the incumbents.
4 
We show that if the input market is very concentrated, entry in the final goods 
market always increases welfare. If the input market is moderately concentrated, entry 
in the final goods market reduces welfare if the entrant is moderately cost inefficient 
than the incumbents. If the input market is highly competitive, entry in the final goods 
market reduces welfare if the entrant is very much cost inefficient than the 
incumbents. Hence, entry in the final goods market may be more desirable under a 
concentrated input market. 
Given the input price, entry of a relatively cost inefficient entrant in the final 
goods market increases competition as well as creates production inefficiency by 
shifting output from the cost efficient incumbent final goods producers to the cot 
inefficient entrant. Hence, if the cost inefficiency of the entrant (compared to the 
incumbents) is sufficiently large, entry reduces welfare, as explained in the existing 
literature. However, entry in our analysis affects the input price due to the presence of 
an imperfectly competitive input market. We get that entry reduces the input price 
                                                 
3 Lahiri and Ono (1988) show the welfare effects of cost reduction in a cost inefficient firm. Though 
they have not considered the issue of entry explicitly, a result similar to Klemperer (1988) follows 
from their analysis. Mukherjee (2007a) shows that entry increases welfare under Stackelberg 
competition irrespective of the marginal cost difference between the incumbent and the entrant.   
4 If horizontal merger is viewed as an opposite situation of entry, our paper may be related to the 
literature on the welfare effects of horizontal mergers in a vertical structure. See, e.g., Gans (2007) and 
the references therein.    3
compared to no entry by increasing the elasticity of the input demand function, thus 
reducing the marginal costs of the incumbents. Since the input price effect depends on 
the input-market concentration, the welfare effects of entry in our analysis also 
depend on the input-market concentration.  
It follows from our analysis that entry in the final goods market increases the 
profits of the incumbent final goods producers if the entrant is sufficiently cost 
inefficient than the incumbents. Tyagi (1999) and Naylor (2002) also show the profit 
raising effects of entry in a vertical structure. While Tyagi (1999) and Naylor (2002) 
respectively show the implications of the demand structure and the upstream agent’s 
preference over the input price and input quantity, cost asymmetry between the 
incumbents and the entrant is responsible for our result. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the 
model and shows the results. Section 3 concludes.  
 
2. The model and the results  
Let us consider an economy with successive Cournot oligopoly as in Greenhut and 
Ohta (1976), Salinger (1988), Abiru et al. (1988), Ishikawa and Spencer (1999) and 
Ghosh and Morita (2007a), to name a few. Assume that there are  1 ≥ m  symmetric 
incumbent final goods producers and an entrant final goods producer denoted by firm 
1 + m . As in Yoshida (2000), we assume that all final goods producers have Leontief 
technologies and use two inputs, say, input 1 and input 2. Input 1 is produced in a 
perfectly competitive input market at a per-unit cost d > 0. Hence, the price of this 
input is d. Input 2 is produced in an imperfectly competitive input market with  1 ≥ n    4
symmetric input suppliers, which produce like Cournot oligopolists and the 
corresponding input price is determined from the input demand function. Each of the 
n input suppliers faces a constant marginal cost production, which is assumed to be 
zero for simplicity. 
We assume that the entrant final goods producer is technologically inefficient 
than the incumbent final goods producers. There are several ways to model 
asymmetry between the final goods producers. We take a simple approach for 
analytical convenience. It is needless to say that our qualitative results are not 
sensitive to this modeling approach. We normalize each incumbent final goods 
producer’s requirement for input 1 to zero, and assume that each incumbent final 
goods producer requires one unit of input 2 to produce one unit of the final good. 
However, the entrant final goods producer requires λ  units of input 1 and one unit of 
input 2 to produce one unit of the final good. Hence, denoting the price of input 2 by 
w, the marginal cost of each incumbent final goods producer is w, while the marginal 
cost of the entrant final goods producer is  c w+ , where  d c λ = . Therefore, c is the 
measure of cost inefficiency of the entrant compared to the incumbent final goods 
producers. Given d, as λ  reduces, it reduces the entrant’s cost inefficiency compared 
to the incumbent final goods producers.
5 
Instead of considering two inputs, another way of considering asymmetry 
between the firms is to assume that all firms face the same input coefficients, but they 
differ in terms of other costs such as distribution costs. With this approach, the 
                                                 
5 It is worth mentioning that different requirements for input 2 can also create cost asymmetries 
between the incumbent and the entrant final goods producers. However, our qualitative results remain 
under this alternative modeling strategy.  
     5
distribution cost in our analysis is normalized to zero for the incumbent final goods 
producers and it is c for the entrant.   
  Assume that the utility function of a representative consumer for the final 
good is  
  H
q




,         ( 1 )  
where  0 > a , q is the total output of the final good and H  is a numeraire good. The 
utility function (1) gives the following inverse market demand function for the final 
good: 
  q a P − = ,           ( 2 )  
where P is price of the product. 
  We consider the following game. At stage 1, the profit-maximizing input 
suppliers produce their outputs like Cournot oligopolists. At stage 2, the profit-
maximizing final goods producers choose their outputs like Cournot oligopolists and 
the profits are realized. We solve the game through backward induction. 
In the following analysis, we will say that entry has occurred if the  1 + m th 
firm is present in the final goods market. Therefore, under entry, there are  1 + m  firms 
producing in the final goods market. The marginal cost of the ith firm,  m i ,..., 2 , 1 = , is 
w and the marginal cost of the  1 + m th firm is  c w+ . However, under no entry, the 
1 + m th firm does not produce in the final goods market. Therefore, under no entry, 
there are symmetric m  firms producing in the final goods market, and each of these 
firms face the marginal cost w. Hence, in the following analysis, the equilibrium 
values for the case of no entry are equivalent to the case of  0 = c  with m  as the total 




2.1. The case of entry 
Let us start the analysis with entry. Hence, there are  1 + m  firms in the final goods 
market. Given the input prices, the ith incumbent final goods producer and the 
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  The equilibrium output of each incumbent final goods producer and the 
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The total demand for input 2 is 
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The maximization problem for the k th supplier of input 2 is,  n k ,..., 2 , 1 = , 
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Given the symmetry of the suppliers of input 2, the equilibrium output of each 
supplier of input 2 is 
 







Ik ,  n k ,..., 2 , 1 = .        ( 8 )  
The total equilibrium supply of input 2 is  
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The equilibrium price of input 2 is 
 







w .                        (10) 
If  0 > c , the equilibrium price of input 2 reduces with the number of suppliers of 
input 2 but it increases with the number of final goods producers. Thus, we show that 
the number of final goods producers can affect the price charged by the imperfectly 
competitive input market in the presence of asymmetric cost final goods producers. 
This result modifies the “independence” result of Greenhut and Ohta (1976), where 
the input prices are independent of the number of symmetric cost final goods 
producers, and it is in line with Mukherjee (2007b) where the firms differ in terms of 
labor productivities and the input price depends on the number of final goods 
producers. The intuition for this result follows easily from Dhillon and Petrakis 
(2002), which show that the input prices are independent of the number of final goods 
producers if the equilibrium outputs and profits of the final goods producers are log-
linear in the input price and the market features such as the number of final goods 
producers.
6 It is immediate from (5) that the equilibrium outputs of the final goods 
                                                 
6 The equilibrium output and profit of the jth final goods producer is log-linear in the input price z and 
the number of final goods producers t if  ) ( ) ( ) , (
* t z t z q j j j φ ψ =  and  ) ( ) ( ) , (
* t z t z j j j ϑ ϕ π = .   8
producers do not satisfy log-linearity in the input prices and the number of final goods 
producers. 
  Since the total final goods production is negatively related to the price of input 
2, it is worth noting that more suppliers of input 2 help to increase the total final 
goods production by reducing the price of input 2, while the higher price of input 2 
due to more final goods producers partially offsets the positive effects of more final 
goods producers on the final goods production. 
  The profit of each incumbent final goods producer and the profit of the entrant 
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Note that the entrant produces positive output if 
max









Welfare under entry, i.e., when the firm  1 + m  is present in the final goods 
market, is  
  H cq
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2.2. The case of no entry   9
Now consider the case of no entry. If we put  0 = c  and consider the number of final 
goods producers as m , the equilibrium values shown in subsection 2.1 are equivalent 
to the case of no entry. 
  Under no entry, the equilibrium total supply of input 2 and the equilibrium 
price of input 2 are respectively  
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Welfare under no entry is 
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2.3. The effects of entry 
Now we are in position to see the effects of entry on the price of input 2, profits and 
welfare. 
 
Proposition 1: If the entrant in the final goods market is cost inefficient than the 
incumbent final goods producers, the equilibrium price of input 2 is lower under entry 
than under no entry.   10
Proof: Since  0 > c , the comparison of the equilibrium prices of input 2 shown in (10) 
and (15) proves the result. Q.E.D. 
 
  It is clear from (10) and (15) that if  0 > c , entry in the final goods market 
increases price elasticity of demand for input 2,
7 and helps to reduce the equilibrium 
input price.  
Let us now compare the equilibrium profits of the incumbent final goods 
producers under entry and under no entry. The profit of each incumbent final goods 
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where 
max * c c < . 
  Hence, the following proposition is immediate. 
 
Proposition 2: Entry in the final goods market increases the profit of each incumbent 
final goods producer if  ) , (
max * c c c∈ . 
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Entry in the final goods market has two effects on the profits of the incumbent 
final goods producers. First, for a given input price, entry in the final goods market 
reduces the profit of the incumbent final goods producers due to a higher competition 
in the final goods market. Second, entry in the final goods market reduces price of 
input 2, thus creating a positive effect on the profits of the final goods producers. If 
the entrant is sufficiently cost inefficient than the incumbents, i.e. c is very high, the 
competition effect is negligible, while entry helps to reduce the marginal cost of the 
incumbent final goods producers due to the input price effect. In this situation, the 
outputs of the incumbent final goods producers are slightly lower under entry than 
under no entry, but they gain from an input price reduction on all inframarginal units. 
As a result, entry in the final goods market increases the profits of the incumbent final 
goods producers if c is sufficiently high, i.e.,  ) , (
max * c c c∈ .  
It is interesting to note that irrespective of the number of suppliers of input 2 
and the number of final goods producers, there always exists c such that entry in the 
final goods market increases the profits of the incumbent final goods producers. It is 
immediate from (16) that if the number of final goods producer increases (i.e., m  
increases) it reduces 
* c , but if the number of suppliers of input 2 increases (i.e., n 
increases), it increases 
* c . Therefore, initial higher competition in the final goods 
market increases the possibility of higher profit of the incumbent final goods 
producers due to entry in the final goods market. If competition in the final goods 
market is already very high, a further increase in competition due to entry does not 
have much effect on the profits of the incumbent firms, while entry creates a positive 
input price effect. In this situation, entry is more likely to increase the profits of the   12
incumbent final goods producers. On the other hand, if the market for input 2 is 
already very competitive, which generates significantly lower input prices, entry in 
the final goods market does not have significant input price effect, while the negative 
competition effect tends to reduce the profits of the incumbent final goods producers.  
Let us now see the welfare effects of entry in the final goods market. Given 
the equilibrium profits and the corresponding welfare under entry and under no entry, 
we cannot compare them generally. Hence, we use numerical examples to show our 
results. We subtract (17) from (13) and plot the difference in Figure 1 for  1 = a , 
1 = = m n  and 
7
2 max = c , in Figure 2 for  1 = a ,  1 = n ,  100 = m  and 
20401
101 max = c , in 
Figure 3 for  1 = a ,  20 = n ,  100 = m  and 
214220
2020 max = c , and in Figure 4 for  1 = a , 
5 = n ,  100 = m  and 
61205
505 max = c .
8 Figure 1 corresponds to the case of entry in an 
existing monopolistic industry like Klemperer (1988). Figures 1 and 2 consider the 
situations where the input market is very much concentrated but the final goods 
market is concentrated in the former while sufficiently competitive in the latter. 
Figures 3 and 4 consider respectively the situations where the input market is very 
competitive and where the input market is moderately competitive. 
Figures 1, 2, 3 and 4 
In both Figures 1 and 2, welfare is higher under entry than under no entry for all 
feasible values of c. Hence, in contrast to Klemperer (1988), where entry in the final 
goods market reduces welfare for sufficiently large cost inefficiency of the entrant 
compared to the incumbent, we show that entry increases welfare for any feasible cost   13
inefficiency of the entrant if the imperfectly competitive input market is very much 
concentrated. However, in Figure 3, where the imperfectly competitive input market 
is very competitive, the welfare effect of entry is similar to Klemperer (1988), i.e., 
entry reduces welfare if the entrant is sufficiently cost inefficient than the incumbents. 
Figure 4, which considers that the imperfectly competitive input market is moderately 
competitive, provides another interesting case where entry reduces welfare for 
moderate values of c, while it increases welfare for very high and for very low values 
of  c. Though, given the complicated welfare expressions, we could not show our 
result generally, our examples show the importance of input market concentration, 
and  suggest that the anti-competitive entry regulation may not be justified in a 
vertical structure if the input market is sufficiently concentrated. Even if the anti-
competitive entry regulations may be justified if the input market is not very 
concentrated, the competitiveness of the input market plays an important role, and 
entry will be prevented for high values of c if the input market is highly competitive, 
while it will be prevented for moderate values of c if the input market is moderately 
competitive. 
The above findings can be explained as follows. In our analysis, the welfare 
effect of entry in the final goods market can be decomposed into three separate 
effects. First, entry increases competition. Given the input price, higher competition 
in the final goods market tends to increase welfare. Second, entry shifts production 
from the incumbents to the entrant. Given the input price, the shift of production from 
the incumbents to the relatively cost inefficient entrant creates production 
inefficiency. This has a negative impact on welfare. These two effects are similar to 
                                                                                                                                            
8 We use ‘The Mathematica 4’ (see Wolfram, 1999) for the figures of this paper.   14
the previous literature (Klemperer, 1988, Lahiri and Ono, 1988 and Ghosh and Saha, 
2007). However, entry in our framework creates a third effect by reducing the price of 
input 2, which reduces the marginal cost of production in the final goods market and 
creates a positive effect on welfare. 
If the input market is very much concentrated, the input price effect becomes 
significant. In this situation, the input price effect along with higher competition 
outweigh the negative effect of production inefficiency created by entry, thus creating 
a higher welfare under entry compared to no entry. 
If the market for input 2 is very competitive, entry in the final goods market 
does not have a significant input price effect. Hence, the above-mentioned third effect 
is negligible, and entry in the final goods market reduces welfare if the entrant is 
sufficiently cost inefficient than the incumbent. 
If the input market is moderately competitive, the input price effect is still an 
important factor and creates higher welfare under entry compared to no entry for the 
high values of c. However, as c falls, it increases the input price, and reduces the 
benefit of the input price effect. Hence, the input price effect gets weaker for 
moderate values of c, and here entry reduces welfare. Though further reduction in c 
makes the input price effect insignificant, it also reduces production inefficiency by 
making the entrant less cost inefficient. Therefore, for low values of c, entry again 
increases welfare by making the competition effect as the important factor. 
Let us now see the reasons for the difference between our result and the 
previous works such as Klemperer (1988) and Lahiri and Ono (1988). If the input 
market is perfectly competitive, which can be the benchmark case of our analysis, the 
price of input 2 is zero (which is the cost of production for this input) irrespective of   15
entry. Hence, standard calculation shows that, under perfectly competitive input 
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9 Recall that the reason for 
welfare reducing entry is due to the creation of production inefficiency in the industry 
by shifting output from the cost efficient incumbent to the cost inefficient entrant. If 
the entrant is very cost inefficient, the production inefficiency effect dominates the 
competition effect, thus reducing welfare. 
Since highly competitive input market in our analysis approximates a perfectly 
competitive input market, we get a result similar to Klemperer (1988) if the market 
for input 2 is very much competitive. However, if the market for input 2 is not very 
competitive, the input price effect plays an important role in determining the welfare 
effects of entry. 
The first effect that we observe in a vertical structure is that entry in the 
vertical structure occurs for a small range of c, since 
bench c c max
max < . Therefore, by 
making entry unprofitable for very high values of c, the vertical structure eliminates 
the possibility of welfare reducing entry for very high values of c. 
Since 
max c c < ) , entry in the vertical structure still occurs for those high values 
of c for which entry reduces welfare in the absence of vertical structure. However, if 
c is very high, it follows from Proposition 2 that entry increases profits of the 
incumbent final goods producers. Hence, for very high values of c, entry in our 
                                                 
9 In the benchmark model, welfare under entry and no entry are given by 
2
2 2 2
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analysis actually creates production efficiency by reducing the input price (see 
Proposition 1), thus increasing the outputs of the incumbent final goods producers. 
However, entry reduces the outputs of the incumbent final goods producers if 
* c c < , where 
* c  is generally higher than c ) . Hence, there still remains a range of c, 
which is  ] , [
* c c ) , over which entry in the vertical structure reduces profits of the 
incumbent final goods producers and it reduces welfare in the absence of a vertical 
structure. In this situation, though entry reduces the outputs and the profits of the 
incumbent final goods producers and creates production inefficiency, the positive 
input price effect may increase welfare as explained above. 
As a final remark, we have focused on the cost inefficiency of the entrant 
compared to the incumbent final goods producers. However, if the entrant is cost 
efficient than the incumbents, entry does not create the above-mentioned production 
inefficiency. Hence, welfare in our framework will always increase if the entrant is 
cost efficient than the incumbents. 
 
3. Conclusion 
Several authors have analyzed the welfare effects of entry in oligopolistic markets. 
However, vertical relationship did not receive due attention in the literature, though 
several industries are characterized by vertical relationships. In a successive Cournot 
oligopoly that explicitly incorporates vertical relationship, we show the welfare 
effects of entry in the final goods market. 
Our results suggest that entry in the final goods market is more desirable if the 
input market is concentrated. In this situation, entry creates a significant positive   17
benefit by reducing the input price, which, in turn, helps to reduce the marginal costs 
of final goods production. We also show that entry in the final goods market increases 
the profits of the incumbent final goods producers if they are sufficiently cost efficient 
than the entrant. 
We show the implications of cost asymmetries in the presence of vertical 
relationships and no scale economies. However, following Ghosh and Morita (2007a), 
we conjecture that if there are free entry and scale economies, the possibility of higher 
welfare under entry in our analysis may either increase or decrease. More entrants 
tend to increase welfare, while the entry cost tends to reduce welfare. The net effect 
depends on the relative strengths of these factors. In general, the industrial structure 
that differs in terms of vertical relationship, the cost asymmetry between the firms and 
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Figure 1: Subtracting (17) from (13) for  1 = a ,  1 = = m n  and 
7
2 max = c . 
 
 







Figure 2: Subtracting (17) from (13) for  1 = a ,  1 = n ,  100 = m  and 
20401
101 max = c . 
 
















Figure 3: Subtracting (17) from (13) for  1 = a ,  20 = n ,  100 = m  and 
214220
2020 max = c . 
 
 









Figure 4: Subtracting (17) from (13) for  1 = a ,  5 = n ,  100 = m  and 
61205
505 max = c . 
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